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The new world trade round was to be a development 
round – and now, thanks to the resistance put up by many 
developing countries in Cancún, the round has reached a 
deadlock. Those most loudly bewailing this fact are the 
trade policy makers from the North, who had previously 
dubbed the Doha Round a ”development round”. In the 
statements made by many governments of industrialized 
countries as well as in large parts of the media, it was 
claimed that the developing countries had missed a major 
chance. It is, though, often overlooked that what the de-
veloping countries rejected was less the development 
round per se than a new trade round based in essence on 
the notions of the industrialized countries. True, it is still 
uncertain whether the developing countries, buoyed by 
their newly kindled spirit of contradiction, will manage to 
gain additional concessions from the industrialized coun-
tries or whether, in the final outcome, they will end up 
empty-handed. But there were good reasons for the stance 
they took in Cancún. 
What would constitute a development round? 
A ”true development round” would provide a positive 
impulse for worldwide growth, poverty reduction in de-
veloping countries, and the continued existence of a rule-
based world trading regime. Among many scholars, de-
velopment-policy institutions, and moderate nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), there is a surprising meas-
ure of consensus on some of the central elements of a 
development round: 
• The industrialized countries would have to cut their 
agricultural subsidies, which currently add up to some 
US$ 300 billion per year. What these subsidies and a 
lack of open markets mean for developing countries 
is a loss of potential export revenues amounting to an 
estimated US$ 40 billion (to compare: taken together, 
official development assistance comes to roughly 
US$ 50 billion per year). 
• It would be essential to improve market access for 
nonagricultural, labor-intensive products from devel-
oping countries, among other things by lowering tariff 
peaks and tariff escalation (tariffs that rise in accord-
ance with processing stage). For many developing 
countries, liberalization of temporary labor migration 
could also mean higher export earnings in their trade 
in services. 
• The so-called Singapore Issues should not be on the 
agenda of the development round. Singapore Issues is 
a term used to refer to negotiations on foreign direct 
investment, competition, transparency in government 
procurement, and trade facilitation. The only one of 
these issues not under dispute is trade facilitation, 
which is about reducing transaction costs and red  
tape in customs administrations. The main argument 
against placing the other issues on the agenda is that 
they would serve to expand the WTO agenda before 
the ”old” market-access problems have been solved. 
The Singapore Issues should for this reason be ad-
journed until the current round has been concluded. 
• It would be important to agree to provide developing 
countries additional support in trade-related capacity-
building as a means of fostering their integration in 
the world economy and their ability to assert their 
rights in the WTO. 
A development round of this kind is part of the Monterrey 
consensus on international development policy: while, 
according to the consensus, all countries are themselves 
primarily responsible for their own economic develop-
ment, international trade policy has to provide a develop-
ment-friendly framework geared to supporting the effects 
of the national policies pursued by developing countries. 
The heads of state and government attending the UN con-
ference in Monterrey committed themselves to this objec-
tive. In Cancún the trade policies of the EU and the US 
were far removed from the Monterrey consensus. 
• International trade increases worldwide growth and improves the chances of successful poverty reduction. A 
development round could reinforce this potential. 
• Development scholars largely agree on what would constitute a development round: improved market access for 
developing countries, no negotiations on investment and competition rules in the current round, additional sup-
port for developing countries in the field of trade-related capacity-building. In contrast to their own rhetoric, how-
ever, trade policy makers in industrialized countries do not feel obliged by this consensus. It is therefore they who 
bear the main responsibility for the failure of Cancún. 
• In Cancún the developing countries successfully presented themselves as an articulate group with the potential to 
block multilateral trade negotiations. It remains to be seen whether they will use their new-won scopes of action 
to take a hand in constructively shaping the world trading system. This will depend largely on newly industrializ-
ing countries (NICs) and anchor countries like India, China, or Brazil. 
• The conference’s failure does not mean a success for developing countries since they failed to achieve their 
trade-policy goals. What remains is the hope that the shock of Cancún will lead to a greater willingness to com-
promise, above all on the part of the industrialized countries, but also on the part of NICs and anchor countries, 
with a view to giving the WTO a more development-friendly shape. If this fails, the multilateral trading system 
would be in serious trouble. 
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The road from Doha to Cancún 
At the WTO ministerial conference in Doha, in November 
2001, member countries launched a new round of trade 
negotiations. Still smarting from the shock of September 
11, the US wanted to make a symbolic gesture in favor of 
multilateralism. The EU sought to win the developing 
countries for the new trade round by dubbing it a “devel-
opment round”. Since then, however, the deadlines set 
have come and gone in all fields under negotiation, with-
out any agreement having been reached on disputed 
points. The EU, the US, and the developing countries 
blocked one another on central issues. The Cancún minis-
terial, at first planned as a stock-taking exercise, was now 
expected to send out a political signal demonstrating the 
member countries’ determination to reach a successful 
conclusion of the development round. In the run-up to 
Cancún it was not even possible to work out a mutually 
agreed-upon draft for a ministerial declaration. The 
chairman of the WTO’s General Council subsequently 
presented, “in personal responsibility”, a draft which 
could in his opinion have served as a basis for negotia-
tions. In the preparatory phase for Cancún this draft was 
harshly criticized by the developing countries for largely 
reflecting the interests of the industrialized countries. 
Substantive points of contention in Cancún 
The Cancún conference was dominated by two issues: 
agricultural liberalization and the start of negotiations on 
the Singapore Issues. There were also two other issues of 
major import on the agenda: subsidies for cotton and 
nonagricultural market access, while all other points 
played a subordinate role on the wide-ranging conference 
agenda. 
Agricultural trade: Industrialized and developing coun-
tries clashed head-on over agricultural issues. Weeks 
before Cancún the US and the EU had agreed on a com-
promise linking an offer of moderate cuts in domestic 
support measures with demands that advanced developing 
countries further open their markets. In its agriculture 
section, the chairman’s draft ministerial declaration 
closely followed this “compromise proposal”, a fact which 
drew harsh criticism from a group of developing coun-
tries. Subsequently, the so-called G-21 was formed, an 
informal association of developing countries under Bra-
zil’s leadership.* 
The G-21 managed to acquire a certain profile in Cancún 
as the ”voice of the developing nations”. Its clout was 
underestimated by the industrialized countries. In a sense, 
the G-21 replaced the Cairns Group, which, including 
some industrialized countries, had in the past pushed for 
across-the-board liberalization of agricultural trade. The 
G-21 now turned into a “South Cairns” which includes 
protection-minded countries like India. This led to a re-
shuffle of positions in the sense that it was now primarily 
the industrialized countries that were expected to liberal-
ize their agricultural markets, with the developing coun-
tries asserting their rights to retain certain protectionist 
measures. With China on board – which here for the first 
time joined a coalition with the developing countries in 
the WTO – the group gained additional political weight, a 
fact underlined by a statement noting that the G-21 repre-
sented “more than half of the world’s population”. 
As the conference got underway, the G-21 flatly declined 
to accept the draft ministerial text as a basis for negotia-
tions. Following a sounding-out phase, negotiations did 
get underway between G-21 and industrialized countries, 
but without making much headway. The second ministe-
                                                 
* Egypt, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, India, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Para-
guay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela. 
rial draft was still based in essence on the US-EU com-
promise paper. The standstill on agriculture blocked all of 
the other areas under negotiation. Once again, liberaliza-
tion of agricultural trade was to become the stumbling 
block  to international trade negotiations. 
The Singapore Issues: In parallel to agriculture, another 
North-South conflict revolved around the start of talks on 
the Singapore Issues. In Doha it had looked as though the 
developing countries had abandoned their resistance to 
their inclusion. Only India had, at the last minute, pushed 
through a formulation stating that a start of negotiations 
should be made conditional on an “explicit consensus” at 
the next ministerial conference. What had at first looked 
like a diplomatic rearguard action turned out in Cancún, to 
the surprise of many observers, to be the means needed to 
rekindle resistance among numerous developing countries. 
Both a group of 70 developing countries under the leader-
ship of Malaysia and India and the group of African coun-
tries came out against the Singapore Issues. The opposing 
side was made up of the EU (together with Japan and 
Korea), which worked furiously for talks on all four Sin-
gapore Issues, rejecting all requests for an unbundling of 
the issues. It quickly became clear that the issues of in-
vestment and competition were running up against stiff 
resistance on the part of the developing countries. The US 
continued to back the EU on the Singapore Issues, but 
without actively pushing for their inclusion. The US’ 
focus was on opening markets in advanced developing 
countries, not on development of new multilateral rules.  
The second draft ministerial text excluded competition 
from the negotiations. However, the even more conten-
tious issue of investment remained, albeit in somewhat 
hedged language, on the conference agenda. Only during 
the last night of negotiations did the EU offer to drop 
investment. This compromise proposal came too late. The 
fronts had already hardened, and the African countries 
continued to speak out against the inclusion of any of the 
Singapore Issues, while Japan and Korea insisted that all 
four issues be included (presumably with an eye to block-
ing once and for all any possible progress in the agricul-
tural talks). 
Cotton: Somewhat surprisingly, just a few months prior to 
Cancún the cotton initiative launched by four West Afri-
can countries was placed on the agenda of the ministerial 
conference. Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad called 
for a decision in Cancún to discontinue all subsidies in the 
cotton sector by the year 2006. The US provides some 
US$ 3 billion per year in subsidies for its 25000 cotton 
producers – a sum roughly equivalent to the gross national 
product of Burkina Faso, where two million people are 
dependent on cotton production. Subsidies in the EU 
amount to US$ 0.6 billion. While the EU continued to 
signal its willingness to negotiate, though without offering 
any concrete concessions, the US was willing to address 
the proposal only in the context of the overall negotiations 
– which meant, in effect, adjourning it indefinitely. Cotton 
turned out to be Cancún’s symbolic issue, and it is in the 
cotton sector that the false development-round rhetoric of 
the industrialized countries was easiest to expose. In fact, 
the passage on cotton contained in the second draft minis-
terial text was little more than a diplomatically worded 
slap in the face: it offered the developing countries pros-
pects of funding, from existing development-cooperation 
measures, to help diversify their export structures – a 
cynical proposal in view of the fact that the only reason 
why the West African cotton producers are not competi-
tive is the cotton subsidies provided in the industrialized 
countries. 
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Nonagricultural market access: The actual core of the 
world trading system was pushed into the shadow of the 
three first issues named above: negotiations on offers to 
open markets in all other goods sectors apart from agricul-
ture. Both the US and the EU had a major interest in gain-
ing substantial concessions from the advanced developing 
countries, which have import barriers far higher than those 
of the industrialized countries. Due to the standstill on 
agriculture, these negotiations remained more or less 
stuck. But here an old polarization began to re-emerge: 
while the developing countries were long more than reluc-
tant to commit themselves to opening their own markets, 
they at the same time demanded tariff reductions in the 
industrialized countries. It is, though, uncertain whether it 
was mainly for tactical reasons that the developing coun-
tries so adamantly refused to make significant concessions 
here, preferring instead to await developments in the agri-
cultural sector. 
The role played by nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) 
There is much evidence to support the thesis that the in-
fluence of NGOs was stronger in Cancún than at the min-
isterial conference in Seattle, which also ended in a fail-
ure. One reason is that the NGOs have continued to pro-
fessionalize in substantive and organizational terms over 
the past few years. Another reason must be sought in the 
successful formation of tactical alliances between NGOs 
and governments of developing countries. The shifting 
emphasis experienced since Seattle from environmental 
and social standards to negotiations on agricultural trade 
and investment paved the way for this solidarity process. 
In Cancún observers noted that together with many devel-
oping countries, a large share of NGOs argued on the 
basis of the development consensus outlined above, some-
times even coming out in favor of further liberalization of 
world trade. Like other institutions such as the World 
Bank, NGOs made use of an array of different instruments 
to influence the outcome of the ministerial: funding of 
studies, consultations with governments in the South, 
tapping of media connections in the North. In this way 
NGOs were instrumental both in ensuring that the indus-
trialized countries would not forget their development-
round rhetoric and in backing the developing countries in 
their resistance to the agenda of the industrialized coun-
tries. But this they achieved by means that are a legitimate 
element of pluralist democracy, and are practiced by other 
interest groups as well. To this extent, the occasional 
voices criticizing NGOs for their lack of democratic le-
gitimacy are mistaken. 
The responsibility for the failure 
There are numerous factors that contributed to the failure 
of the Cancún conference. On the one hand, there are 
procedural deficits (inefficient conduct of the negotia-
tions, a premature decision to break off the talks). On the 
other hand, the – differently grounded – resistance put up 
by the developing countries to the last draft of the ministe-
rial text prevented the conference from ending with a 
substantive political statement. However, the main re-
sponsibility for the conference’s failure lies squarely on 
the shoulders of the industrialized countries, and here in 
particular on those of the EU, which, in the first place, and 
despite its rhetoric, was unwilling to carry its share of the 
burden of a ”genuine” development round and, in the 
second place, seriously underestimated the resistance of 
the developing countries. 
The problem behind all this was a clash between different 
action logics and interests: the development-round rheto-
ric implies that reforms will be launched that are in line 
with the specific interests of the developing nations. This 
is a position that abstracts from political and economic 
self-interests, assuming in their place a global public in-
terest. It is therefore not by chance that scholars, devel-
opment-policy institutions (World Bank), and NGOs have 
little trouble reaching consensus on some issues: they all 
argue within the (normative) framework of just such a 
logic. 
Negotiations in the WTO, however, do not proceed on 
this pattern; they instead follow a highly pragmatic politi-
cal rationale defined by the nations involved, one that 
takes account of economic special interest groups. In 
contrast to their development rhetoric, the industrialized 
countries have adhered to this rationale. This is the only 
plausible explanation for statements like the one found in 
an internal EU paper insinuating that a reform of agricul-
tural trade along the lines of the G-21 proposal would 
“impose the whole burden of adjustment exclusively on 
developed countries”. This would in fact have been one 
consequence of a development round (although, argued 
from a normative welfare economist’s standpoint, the 
adjustment would have proven highly beneficial to the 
industrialized countries themselves, because the agricul-
tural policy to which they subscribe is in fact detrimental 
to their own interests). But it is the resistance of a home-
grown agricultural lobby that continues to prevent any 
development-oriented reform –an argument that is diffi-
cult to swallow for those who are working for the global 
public good. 
In this sense, the development round rhetoric indulged in 
particular by the EU has rebounded on the Union itself. 
Another factor working to the detriment of Cancún was 
that the EU underestimated the resistance of the develop-
ing countries to the EU’s hard-nosed ’business-as-usual’ 
policy, the outcome being that the compromise proposal 
on the Singapore Issues simply came too late. Evidently, 
the European Commission failed to coordinate its foreign, 
development, and trade policies in such a way as to enable 
it to adequately perceive the resistance of the developing 
countries in the run-up to Cancún. In Cancún the EU dog-
gedly nurtured the impression that the developing coun-
tries would, in the end, and as they always had in the past, 
bow to the agenda of the industrialized countries. This 
proved to be a fallacy. 
The role played by the developing countries 
Cancún experienced the successful resurgence of an active 
developing-country block in international trade policy. 
Many of the demands it pressed for stood squarely on the 
ground of the Monterrey consensus, and its rejection of 
the ministerial draft was therefore understandable. But if 
block formation is not to end up in a Pyrrhic victory, the 
newly industrializing countries (NICs) and anchor coun-
tries (i.e. the countries important for their own region of 
the world, including e.g. India, China, or Brazil) are going 
to have to assume greater responsibility for the continued 
existence of the multilateral trading system. This means, 
among other things, that they are going to have to be pre-
pared, in their own interest as well as in the interest of the 
less developed countries, to accept further market-opening 
commitments. Only under this condition will it be possible 
to shepherd the development round to a successful con-
clusion, since otherwise the industrialized countries will 
lack an important incentive to reach an agreement. 
The African countries and the LDCs should be careful not 
to fall into the trap of presenting themselves as defensive 
naysayers and making too frequent use of their veto 
power. In Cancún, for instance, the LDCs addressed the 
problem of preference erosion. The relative advantage of 
a market access more preferential than that accorded to 
advanced developing countries will shrink if agreement is 
reached on a general reduction of tariffs. This made the 
LDCs less disposed to engage in constructive negotia-
tions. As understandable as this position may be for the 
short term, the LDCs are here running the risk of becom-
ing even more dependent on preferential agreements of 
doubtful effectiveness. Furthermore, the LDCs are also in 
danger of further isolating themselves from the other de-
veloping countries and thus finding themselves even more 
marginalized in political and economic terms than they 
already are. For the future, it would make more sense to 
address the real supply-side problems of LDCs with addi-
tional development cooperation than to allow them to fall 
into the role of the unloved heel-draggers of the world 
trading system. 
The future of the multilateral trading system 
The failure of the WTO ministerial conference in Cancún 
cannot be regarded as a success. It would have been a 
success if the attending heads of government and state had 
committed themselves to a genuine development round 
geared to boosting worldwide growth and promoting pov-
erty reduction. And the consequences of Cancún? The 
conference could influence the multilateral trading system 
in at least three directions: (1) a more marked inclination 
of the industrialized countries to seek bilateral and re-
gional trade agreements; (2) development of a “two-
tiered” multilateral trading system; (3) promotion of a new 
spirit of compromise on the part of industrialized coun-
tries and NICs, linked with procedural reforms of the 
WTO. 
Most observers fear that international trade policy may 
now be headed more in the direction of bilateral and 
regional agreements, as announced immediately after the 
conference by the US trade representative. Just a few days 
after Cancún, for instance, Colombia and Peru left the G-21 
to enter into bilateral trade talks with the US. A large 
number of trade blocks would raise the transaction costs 
of world trade, for one thing because of the complicated 
rules of origin involved, and would tend to erode the mul-
tilateral trading system. Since developing countries are in 
most cases accorded even fewer concessions in bilateral 
talks with the powerful industrialized countries than they 
can expect from multilateral negotiations conducted in the 
framework of the WTO, they could, in the end, turn out to 
be the losers. In the short term, though, it is more or less 
unlikely that the industrialized countries will succeed in 
concluding bilateral agreements with NICs and anchor 
countries, because the substantive points under dispute 
will not change that way either. Seen in these terms, the 
industrialized countries’ nod in the direction of a suppos-
edly more favorable bilateralism must be seen, at least in 
part, as a shift in their own political rhetoric: from the 
carrot (of the development round) to the stick (of a possi-
ble erosion of multilateralism). Developing countries are 
now faced with the bitter question of whether to save 
multilateralism by consenting to a compromise unfavor-
able to them. 
One further consequence of Cancún could be that the 
WTO member states will again depart from the principle 
of the single undertaking, a move that would give rise to a 
“two-tiered” world trading system. Not unlike the To-
kyo Round under the old GATT, some agreements – on 
investment, for instance, – would then be signed only by 
the advanced member states. The two-speed principle 
could also be applied for talks on market access, where it 
was practiced as special and different treatment in the  
past: with the big trading powers negotiating tariff reduc-
tions among one another, passing them along to other-
WTO members in the guise of most-favored-nation treat-
ment, and losing no sleep over whether the LDCs them-
selves lower their tariffs. This scenario is not without its 
pitfalls for LDCs: aside from the fact that, according to 
economic theory, all countries harm primarily themselves 
by imposing customs tariffs, under this scenario such 
countries would at the same time lose any possibilities to 
influence the further development of the multilateral trade 
rules. Compared with a further fragmentation of the world 
into regional trading blocks, this scenario would at least 
offer the one advantage of preserving the multilateral 
trading system. 
The most desirable, and at the same time most unlikely, 
consequence of Cancún could be that industrialized coun-
tries and NICs alike will step back, take a hard look at 
their common interests, and start to work on building a 
greater willingness to compromise. The cooling-off 
period dictated by the failure of Cancún would now have 
to be used to reform the WTO’s decision-making struc-
tures (a more independent and stronger WTO Secretariat, 
transparent decision-making procedures) and to sound out 
potential fields for compromise. In substantive terms, the 
industrialized countries should above all make additional 
concessions on agricultural trade and further open their 
markets to nonagricultural products, while, in return, the 
NICs should be prepared to offer facilitated terms of ac-
cess to their markets – including for labor-intensive prod-
ucts from LDCs. As far as the Singapore Issues are con-
cerned, only transparency in government procurement and 
trade facilitation would be placed on the agenda. This 
scenario would call for the industrialized countries to 
dampen the influence of economic special interest groups 
on their national trade policies. NICs and anchor countries 
would have to succeed in developing from a blockade 
power into a creative force for change. 
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